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     Considerable media attention has been devoted to the increase in cash holdings of American firms. For 
instance, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal states that “The piles of cash and stockpile of 
repurchased shares at [big U.S. companies] have hit record levels”.
1 In this paper, we investigate how 
cash holdings of American firms have evolved since 1980 and whether this evolution can be understood 
using existing models of cash holdings. We find that there is a secular increase in the cash holdings of the 
typical firm. In a regression of the average cash to assets ratio on a constant and time from 1980-2004, 
time has a significantly positive coefficient implying that the average cash to assets ratio (the cash ratio) 
has increased by 0.45% per year. Another way to see this evolution is that the average cash ratio more 
than doubles from 10.48% to 24.03% between 1980 and 2004. 
This increase in cash holdings is paradoxical. We would expect improvements in financial technology 
to reduce cash holdings. After all, firms can hedge more effectively as more types of derivatives become 
available, so that the precautionary demand for cash should fall. We would also expect firms to become 
better able to forecast their cash needs and to better keep track of their liquid assets.   
The increase in cash holdings that we document has dramatic implications for leverage if cash is 
netted out of debt when computing leverage. Much of the finance literature measures leverage by 
considering the ratio of debt to assets or debt to equity. Using these popular definitions of leverage, there 
is little evidence of a decrease in leverage for American firms. However, the net debt ratio (debt minus 
cash, divided by assets) exhibits a sharp secular decrease and most of this decrease in net debt is 
explained by the increase in cash holdings.  The fall in net debt is so dramatic that average net debt for 
American firms is negative in 2004. In other words, on average, American firms could have paid off their 
debt with their cash holdings.  
After documenting the increase in cash holdings and the decrease in net debt, we investigate why the 
increase in cash holdings has taken place. Much attention has been paid to the cash hoards in excess of 
                                                 
1 “Capital Pains: Big Cash Hoards”, by Ian McDonald, Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2006, p. C1.    4
$30 billion in mid-2006 of firms like Microsoft and Exxon.
2 We find that the increase in the average cash 
to assets ratio (the cash ratio) is not explained by the evolution of cash holdings for large firms or in 
recent years. The average cash ratio has a significant positive time trend for all firm size quintiles. Only 
the evidence for the largest firms is due to the recent cash buildup. Recently, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite 
(2006) argue that a reason for the cash buildup is that U.S. firms had profits trapped abroad that would 
have been taxed had they been repatriated. We find that firms that have no foreign taxable income, firms 
with presumably little or no foreign activities, experience a larger increase in cash holdings than firms 
that have foreign taxable income.  
The increase in cash holdings is closely related to the disappearing dividends phenomenon 
documented by Fama and French (2001). There is a clear time trend in cash holdings and in net debt for 
firms that do not pay dividends. There is no time trend in these variables for firms that pay dividends. In 
other words, average cash holdings of established stable firms hardly increase over our sample period. 
Firms with more recent listings tend to be non-dividend payers. For non-payers, the mean ratio of cash to 
total assets more than doubles from 1980 to 2004 and the median ratio of cash to total assets more than 
triples from 1980 to 2004. Over the same period, the average net debt ratio for non-dividend payers falls 
from 19.32% to -4.51% and the median ratio from 21.44% to -6.18%.  
To understand why cash holdings increased, we follow two separate approaches. Both approaches 
start from the equation estimated in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999, OPSW) to explain 
cash holdings. With the first approach, we investigate whether allowing for changes in the intercept and 
slopes of the estimated regression for the 1990s and 2000s is helpful in explaining the cross-section of 
cash holdings. Though there is evidence of changes in slopes and intercepts, we find that the regression 
which does not allow for changes in slopes and intercepts explains roughly as much of the cross-section 
of cash holdings as a regression that allows for such changes. While OPSW do not take into account 
                                                 
2 See Ian McDonald, “Cash Dilemma:  How to Spend It,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2006, p. C3.  Jesse Eisenger, 
“Long & Short: The Tech Sector is Hogging the Green Blanket,” Wall Street Journal April 5, 2006, p. C1.  Simon 
London, “A Surplus of Cash Invariably Leads to a Shortage of Sense,” Financial Times, November 30, 2005.   5
recent capital raising as a predictor of cash holdings, we do so and see that doing so increases the adjusted 
R-square of the regression by about 4%. With this approach, there is no evidence of an exogenous 
increase in the demand for cash by corporations.  
With our second approach, we estimate the OPSW model for the 1980s and use it to predict cash 
holdings in the 1990s and the 2000s. Strikingly, there is no evidence for the sample as a whole that firms 
hold abnormal amounts of cash in 2001-2004. The model estimated over the 1980s helps explain why 
cash holdings are high in recent years, however. In the cases where cash holdings are significantly higher 
or lower than predicted by the model, the departures are mostly small. Over 2001-2004, the only sizeable 
average mistakes are that the model overstates cash holdings by dividend payers by about 3% of assets 
and understates holdings of firms within five years of their IPO by 8%.  
Since the OPSW model tracks well the increase in average cash holdings for the whole sample, we 
use it to understand which changes in firm characteristics help explain the increase in cash holdings. 
Three variables are particularly important. First, firm cash flow risk increases substantially. Since cash 
holdings are positively related to firm risk, the increase in firm risk has a substantial impact on cash 
holdings. Second, firms hold less net working capital (net of cash), and in particular hold fewer 
inventories and accounts receivable. Since the non-cash components of working capital and cash are 
substitutes, the decrease in the non-cash components of working capital not surprisingly leads to an 
increase in cash holdings. Essentially, firms hold fewer inventories but substitute cash for inventories. 
Third, capital expenditures fall. In our estimate of the model, cash holdings are negatively related to 
capital expenditures. 
   The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly review theories of cash holdings and 
the existing evidence. We then describe how our sample is constructed in Section 2 and show that there is 
a secular trend in cash holdings and net debt for our sample. In Section 3, we examine subsamples to 
understand which types of firms explain this secular trend. In Section 4, we estimate the OPSW model 
allowing for changes in slopes and intercepts for the 1990s and 2000s and taking into account fund-  6
raising activities. In Section 5, we use the OPSW model estimated for the 1980s to identify the changes in 
firm characteristics which explain the increase in cash holdings. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
Section 1. Why firms hold cash 
  The economics and finance literature have identified four motives for firms to hold cash. We 
review the theory and evidence on these motives briefly: 
a)  The transaction motive. Classic models in finance (e.g., Baumol, 1952, Miller 
and Orr, 1966) derive optimal demands for cash when a firm incurs a transaction cost when 
converting a non-cash financial asset into cash and uses cash for payments. There are 
economies of scale with the transactions motive, so that large firms hold less cash. There is 
much evidence supporting the existence of these economies of scale (see, for instance, 
Mulligan, 1997).  
b)  The precautionary motive. Firms hold cash to be in a better position to cope with 
adverse shocks when access to capital markets is costly. OPSW find evidence supportive of 
this motive in their work. In particular, they find that riskier firms hold more cash. With the 
precautionary motive, we expect firms with better investment opportunities to hold more cash 
because adverse shocks that lead to financial distress are more costly for them. OPSW also 
find support for this prediction using market-to-book and R&D spending as proxies for 
investment opportunities. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) model the precautionary 
demand for cash and find that financially-constrained firms invest in cash out of cash flow, 
while unconstrained firms do not. Further, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2006) develop a 
model showing that firms accumulate cash instead of reducing debt when the correlation 
between operating income and investment opportunities is low. In their model, firms that 
issue debt and hoard cash transfer income from future high cash flow states of the world to 
enable them to fund investment in all states of the world, including those with low cash flow.    7
c)  The agency motive. As argued by Jensen (1986), entrenched managers would 
rather hold on to cash when the firm has poor investment opportunities than increase payouts 
to shareholders. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) find cross-country evidence 
suggesting that firms hold more cash in countries with greater agency problems. Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2006) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) show that cash is worth 
less when agency problems between insiders and outside shareholders are greater. Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2006) and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2006) provide evidence 
suggesting that entrenched management actually spends excess cash quickly.  
d)  The tax motive. Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2006) point out that firms that 
generate income abroad have incentives to keep that income abroad in order to avoid taxes 
upon repatriation. Consequently, multinational firms may optimally accumulate cash abroad.  
 
These four motives for holding cash have different implications for the causes and consequences of 
the secular increase in cash that we document. We would expect firms to become more efficient over time 
in handling transactions, so that the transactions motive would require lower cash holdings. The growth in 
derivatives markets and improvements in forecasting and control suggest that everything else equal, the 
precautionary motive would require lower cash holdings also. However, it is well-known that there has 
been a secular increase in idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001). Irvine and Pontiff 
(2005) show that the increase in idiosyncratic risk mirrors an increase in cash flow volatility. Such an 
increase would be consistent with an increase in the volatility of unhedgeable risks and hence the 
precautionary motive would suggest greater cash holdings. Further, as shown in Fama and French (2004), 
the composition of firms has changed because of an influx of newly listed firms with weaker track records. 
Brown and Kapadia (2006) demonstrate that the newly listed firms have apparently permanently higher 
idiosyncratic risk, so that the increase in idiosyncratic risk is due to these firms. These firms would be 
more concerned about being financially constrained and hence would hold more cash. We would   8
therefore expect cash holdings to be affected by how close a firm is to its IPO. For the increase in the 
average cash ratio to be explained by Jensen’s free cash flow theory, it would have to be that firms did 
well and that there was little pressure on management to pay out cash even as cash holdings grew. With 
this explanation, American management would be more entrenched.   
 
Section 2. The increase in cash holdings and the decrease in net debt 
We construct our sample of firms from the Compustat annual industrial files on the WRDS database 
for the period 1980-2004. These data include survivors and non-survivors that appeared on Compustat at 
any time in the sample period.  We require that the firms have positive assets (data item #6) and positive 
sales (data item #12) to be included in a given year.  We exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6999), because they may carry cash to meet capital requirements rather than for the economic reasons 
studied here. We also exclude utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) because their cash holdings 
can be subject to regulatory supervision in a number of states.  Finally, we restrict our sample to firms 
that are incorporated in the U.S. 
The second column of Table 1 reports the number of firms for each sample year. We see that the 
number of firms follows an inverted u shape and peaks in 1997.  We measure liquid asset holdings as the 
ratio of cash and marketable securities (data item #1) to total assets (data item #6).
3  The third column of 
Table 1 reproduces the average cash ratio. This ratio is 10.48% in 1980. It falls in eight years and 
increases in sixteen years over the sample period. At the end of the sample period the average cash ratio is 
24.03%. The same trend is conveyed by the median cash ratio, which is reproduced in column four. The 
median ratio is 5.48% in 1980. It increases during sixteen years over the sample period. It falls by more 
than 1% of assets during only three years. Strikingly, the median actually increases more than the mean. 
The median cash ratio in 2004 is 169% of the median cash ratio in 1980, while the mean is 129% of its 
value in 1980.  
                                                 
3 While not reported in this paper, we also measure liquidity using the cash-to-sales ratio. This does not affect our 
main results in a material way.   9
In a typical year, the average cash ratio increases. To verify that there is a secular increase in the cash 
ratio, we estimate regressions of the cash ratio on a constant and time measured in years. The coefficient 
on the time trend for the average cash ratio is 0.45% with a p-value below 0.01. The R-square of the 
regression is 86%. For the median, the slope coefficient is lower, 0.23%, but it also has a p-value below 
0.01. The R-square is 55%. This evidence is consistent with the existence of a positive time trend in cash 
holdings.  
We now turn to the implications of this increase in the cash ratio for the measurement of leverage. 
Column five of Table 1 shows average leverage. We measure leverage as debt (long-term debt plus debt 
in current liabilities) divided by total assets. We see that leverage falls over the period 2001 to 2004. 
However, leverage in 2004 is almost the same as leverage ten years earlier, so there is no evidence of a 
time-trend. Examining median leverage, reported in column six, we see that leverage is low in the first 
half of the 1990s, but then increases before falling over the period from 1998 to 2004. However, when we 
consider instead the average net debt ratio, which nets cash from debt, shown in column seven, we reach a 
dramatically different conclusion. The net debt ratio is 16.45% in 1980. It falls during fifteen years and 
reaches -1.48% in 2004. In a regression of the average net debt ratio on a constant and time, the 
coefficient on time is -0.56% with a p-value of less than 0.01. The last column of the table shows the 
median net debt ratio. This ratio falls from 17.84% to -0.30% over the sample period.  
 
Section 3. How pervasive is the increase in cash holdings? 
Section 2 shows that there is a secular increase in the average cash ratio and a secular decrease in net 
debt. It is also clear from the data that the decrease in net debt occurs because firms hold more cash rather 
than because they have less debt. We show in the introduction that there has been much focus in the 
financial press recently on the hoards of cash held by the largest firms. It could therefore be that our 
finding of a secular increase in cash is due to the increase in cash of large firms in recent years. To   10 
examine this possibility, we divide the sample firms each year into quintiles according to the book value 
of their assets at the end of the prior year. The results are similar if we use the market value of equity. 
Figure 1 reports the average cash ratios for the firm size quintiles over our sample period. We see 
immediately that the average cash ratio increases across all firm size quintiles, but the increase is much 
sharper for the smaller firms. It is also clear from the figure that the increase in the average cash ratio for 
the largest firms is especially strong in the later years of our sample. Table 2a reports the average cash 
ratios for the five quintiles throughout our sample period. We see that average cash holdings more than 
double for the second and third quintiles and almost double for all other quintiles. Our earlier finding of a 
time trend for the average cash ratio holds for each size quintile.  
Each average cash ratio is computed across at least 700 firms so that outliers cannot have much of an 
impact on the average cash ratio. In general, though, the median cash ratio is lower than the average cash 
ratio. It follows that the distribution of cash ratios appears skewed to the right. Though not reproduced in 
Table 2a, the medians increase through time across all size quintiles. However, the time trend is not 
significant for the medians for the two largest size quintiles. The evidence for a secular increase in cash 
ratios is therefore stronger for the three lowest quintiles.  
The medians of the two largest quintiles exhibit an extremely sharp increase after 1998. For instance, 
for the largest quintile, the median in 1998 is 2.90%. By 2004, the median is 7.76%. This doubling of the 
median in six years is not matched by a doubling of the average over the same period of time. The 
average increases steadily over the whole sample period and does not show much acceleration towards 
the end of the sample period. Not surprisingly, therefore, our evidence of a time-trend for the average 
holds if we eliminate the last four years of our sample. Consequently, the secular increase in cash 
holdings cannot be explained by the recent increases focused on by the financial press.  
The increase in cash holdings that the financial press has focused on is most visible when we compare 
the S&P 500 firms to the other firms in the sample (not reported). From this perspective, the increase in 
cash holdings of the S&P 500 firms since 1998 is dramatic since their average cash ratio doubles from   11 
1998 to 2004. The change in the median cash ratio for these firms is even more dramatic. In 1998, the 
median cash ratio of S&P 500 firms is 2.79%. This ratio increases to 9.93% in 2004, so that it more than 
triples from 1998 to 2004. During that period, the median net debt ratio falls from 20.73% to 8.90%.  
The 1990s witnessed numerous IPOs. Recent IPO firms could be expected to have more cash because 
of the IPO and because they often issue equity in a secondary offering within years of the IPO. In 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 2b, we report average cash ratios for firms that, respectively, did and did not 
have an IPO within five years. We see that the average cash ratio more than doubles for non-IPO firms 
during our sample period and nearly doubles for the IPO firms. Though we do not reproduce the medians, 
the median cash ratio for IPO firms triples over our sample period.  Nevertheless, when we estimate the 
time trend, it is significant for the average and the median for both groups of firms. The increase in cash 
holdings is therefore not driven by IPO firms.   
Another possible explanation for the increase in the cash ratio is that economic growth was high in 
the 1990s, so that firms were less likely to be economically distressed and hence were less likely to have 
to use up their cash reserves. Firms with negative net income are much more likely to be financially 
constrained than firms with positive net income. Using negative net income as an index of the probability 
that a firm is financially constrained, we split the sample between firms with negative net income and 
other firms and report average cash ratios for these subsamples in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2b.  The 
firms with negative net income have a dramatic increase in cash holdings. The average cash ratio of these 
firms almost triples while the median cash ratio (not reported) almost quadruples. The firms with positive 
net income also exhibit an increase in cash holdings, but the time trend is markedly lower and only 
significant for the average cash holdings.  
We turn next to the role of dividends. Fama and French (2001) show that firms have become less 
likely to pay dividends. Consider a firm that in 1980 would have paid dividends and an identical firm in 
2000 that does not. Everything else equal, the firm in 2000 would have more cash. In the last two 
columns of Table 2b we reproduce the time series of the average cash ratio for regular dividend payers   12 
and non-dividend payers. The average cash ratio of dividend payers in year t is the average cash ratio of 
firms that pay a dividend that year. The results are striking. There is a dramatic increase in the cash ratio 
among the non-dividend payers, but no evidence of a time trend for the dividend payers. For instance, the 
average cash ratio of dividend payers is about the same in 2000 as in 1980. In contrast, the average cash 
ratio of non-dividend payers is roughly 111.91% higher in 2004 than in 1980. Even more striking is the 
increase in the median cash ratio (not reported). In 1980, the median cash ratio is 5.98%. In 2004, it is 
19.39%. Consequently, over our sample the median cash ratio increases by 224.25%. The evidence that 
non-dividend payers increase their cash ratio so much is consistent with the evidence in Brown and 
Kapadia (2006) that newly listed firms have higher idiosyncratic risk.  
Finally, Hartzell et al. (2006) point out that over our sample period multinationals benefited from 
leaving abroad the cash they earned abroad as long as that the income repatriated from abroad would have 
been taxed in the U.S. at a higher rate than it was taxed abroad. After the end of our sample period, firms 
were allowed to repatriate cash held in foreign countries at a lower tax rate. We use firms with positive 
foreign pre-tax income to identify firms for which avoidance of taxation on foreign income might lead to 
higher cash holdings. There is no evidence that cash holdings increase more for firms with foreign taxable 
income.  
 
Section 4. Did the demand function for cash holdings change?  
In this section, we investigate whether the increase in the average cash ratio can be explained by firm 
characteristics and whether the relation between various firm characteristics and the cash ratio changes 
over time. For this examination, we start from the regression in OPSW that relates the cash ratio to firm 
characteristics. The data required to estimate the OPSW regression limits the size of the sample. To see 
this, note that the unrestricted sample has 3,693 observations in 2004. In contrast, the sample that has the 
data to estimate the OPSW regressions has 3,218 observations. However, the sample that meets the data 
requirements of the OPSW regression model has an average increase in the cash ratio of 120.72% over   13 
the sample period. This increase is close to the increase of 129.29% for the unrestricted sample. Not 
surprisingly, there is a significant time trend in the average and median cash ratios for the restricted 
sample.    
The firm characteristics included in the OPSW regression are motivated by the various theories of 
corporate cash holdings discussed in Section 1. We modify the OPSW model to add the ratio of a firm’s 
acquisition expense to assets as an additional variable since acquisitions and capital expenditures would 
seem to be substitutes.  
The variables used in the OPSW regression are as follows: 
a)  Market-to-book ratio. Firms with better investment opportunities value cash 
more since it is more costly for these firms to be financially constrained. We use the book 
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity as the 
numerator of the ratio and the book value of the assets as the denominator. 
b)  Firm size. There are economies of scale to holding cash. We use as our size 
measure the logarithm of total assets in 2004 dollars. 
c)  Cash-flow-to-assets. We measure cash flow as earnings after interest, dividends 
and taxes but before depreciation divided by book assets. Firms with higher cash flow 
accumulate more cash, everything else equal. Such firms might have better investment 
opportunities, but we control for these through other variables. 
d)  Net working capital to assets. Net working capital is composed of assets that can 
substitute for cash. We would therefore expect a negative relation between net working 
capital and cash holdings. We subtract cash (data item #1) from net working capital (data 
item #179), so that our net working capital measure is net of cash.   
e)  Capital expenditures to assets. We measure capital expenditures as the ratio of 
capital expenditures (data item #128) to assets (data item #6). Capital expenditures consume 
cash, so that we would expect capital expenditures to reduce cash. At the same time, however,   14 
capital expenditures could proxy for costs of financial distress and/or investment 
opportunities, in which case they would be positively related to cash.  
f)  Leverage. We measure leverage using the debt/assets ratio, defined as (long-term 
debt plus debt in current liabilities) / book value of assets. To the extent that debt is 
sufficiently constraining, we would expect firms to use cash to reduce leverage, so that there 
would be a negative relation between cash holdings and leverage. However, the hedging 
argument of Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2006) would be consistent with a positive 
relation between leverage and cash holdings. 
g)  Industry Cash flow risk. We expect firms with greater cash flow risk to hold 
more precautionary cash. We measure cash flow risk as the standard deviation of industry 
cash flow computed as follows. For each firm, we compute cash flow standard deviation for 
the previous ten years. We require at least three observations for the standard deviation to be 
calculated.  We then take the average across the 2-digit SIC code of the firm cash flow 
standard deviations. 
h)  Dividend payout dummy. We define a dummy variable set equal to one in years 
where a firm pays a dividend. Otherwise the dummy equals zero. Dividends consume cash. 
Further, firms that pay dividends are likely to be less risky and have greater access to capital 
markets, so that the precautionary motive for cash holdings is weaker for them.  
i)   R&D to sales. This variable also measures growth opportunities. Firms with 
greater R&D to sales are assumed to have greater costs of financial distress. Though R&D 
expenditures consume cash and hence would appear to decrease cash, R&D’s role as a proxy 
for growth opportunities and financial distress could lead to a positive relation between the 
cash ratio and R&D spending.  
j)  Acquisitions to assets. Acquisition activity is defined as acquisitions (data item 
#129) / book assets. Acquisitions consume cash.    15 
 
It is important to note that activities that consume cash, such as capital expenditures and acquisitions, 
would have no impact on a firm’s cash holdings if the firm could replenish its cash holdings immediately 
to stay at the optimum amount of cash holdings. One would not expect firms to be in a position to always 
be at the long-run optimum, so that activities that consume cash will, everything else equal, have an 
adverse effect on cash holdings. 
Model 1 of Table 3 shows the estimates for the regression using all sample years. Given our data 
restrictions, the panel consists of 94,699 firm-year observations for 12,441 unique firms.  We account for 
serial correlation in the residuals of individual firms. We do not use dummy variables for years or for 
industry in this regression. In OPSW, market-to-book and cash flow risk have consistently positive 
coefficients across specifications. They have positive coefficients in our regression as well. In OPSW, 
size, net working capital, leverage and the dividend dummy have consistently negative coefficients across 
specifications. They have negative coefficients here too. R&D to sales has a significant positive 
coefficient, which it has also in OPSW for most regressions. We also find that capital and acquisition 
expenditures are associated with negative and significant coefficients.  
In unreported results, we estimate the regression using a different dependent variable, namely cash 
over assets minus cash. This measure is the one that OPSW use. The problem with this measure over our 
sample period is that it generates extreme outliers for firms with almost no assets but cash. Hartzell et al. 
(2006) use the logarithm of this measure which reduces but does not eliminate the influence of outliers in 
the dependent variable for a number of firms. If we use this measure, the regression coefficients are 
qualitatively the same but the coefficients are much larger.
4 We also estimate the regression to allow for 
macroeconomic conditions to affect the demand for cash. First, we include yearly dummies. Second, we 
include a short-term interest rate. The short-term interest rate is never significant. The yearly dummies 
                                                 
4 Hartzell et al. also add foreign pre-tax income and domestic pre-tax income variables to the regression as well as a 
tax burden variable. Using these variables would force us to shorten our sample period, so we do not include 
regressions with these variables. The sample of Hartzell et al. includes only firms with assets in excess of $100 
million. We do not impose this restriction in our analysis.    16 
have no impact on the regression coefficients we focus on. We do not report the regression with yearly 
dummies because we allow for changes in intercept in the regressions we discuss next. Finally, we used 
an alternative measure of cash flow risk, estimating cash flow volatility over five years of data instead of 
ten. The results do not change with that alternate measure.  
To investigate whether there is a regime change in the 1990s or the 2000s for the demand for cash, we 
estimate the OPSW regression in Model 2 of Table 3, allowing for changes in the intercept for the 1990s 
or the 2000s. We add two indicator variables to the regression: the first indicator variable takes value one 
for years 1990 and after; the second indicator variable takes value one for years 2000 and after. 
Consequently, the indicator variable for the 2000s tells us how the intercept for these years differs from 
the intercept for the 1990s. If the cash ratio increased for exogenous reasons unrelated to firm 
characteristics, we would expect these indicator variables to have positive and significant coefficients. We 
find that the estimates of the indicator variables are significantly negative. Consequently, firm 
characteristics must explain the increase in the cash ratio in the 2000s.  
It is possible that the intercepts do not change over time but that the slopes do. This would be the case 
if the influence of firm characteristics on the cash ratio changes over time. We examine this possibility in 
Model 3 of Table 3, which allows for the slopes to differ by decade. The most striking result is perhaps 
that allowing the slopes and intercepts to differ by decade has no impact on the adjusted R-square. It is 
true that some of the interactions are significant. In particular, the coefficient on cash flow risk is much 
higher in the 1990s and 2000s. So is the coefficient on size. Strikingly, by the 2000s, the traditional 
negative relation between cash holdings and size does not seem to exist anymore. The coefficient on 
acquisitions is much lower in the 1990s and 2000s and so is the coefficient on dividends.  
In the last regression, we modify the model to account for equity issues and debt issues as well as 
proximity to an IPO. We define net debt issuance as debt issuance (data item #111) minus debt retirement 
(data item #114), divided by book assets.  Likewise, net equity issuance is calculated as equity sales (data 
item #108) minus equity purchases (data item #115), divided by book assets. Since Section 3 shows that   17 
firms reporting a loss have more cash, we also add a dummy variable for firms reporting a loss. Finally, 
we add dummy variables for firms’ two-digit industry SIC code. Adding these variables increases the 
adjusted R-square by roughly four percent. As expected, IPO firms hold more cash, but the cash ratio falls 
as the IPO gets more distant. We would expect firms that issue more equity or more debt to have more 
cash. This is true, but not in the 2000s. However, taking into account these additional variables has no 
meaningful impact on the intercepts.  
There are several important lessons from these regressions. First, allowing for time variation in the 
coefficients adds little to the explanatory power of the regressions. Second, the negative relation between 
cash holdings and firm size breaks down in the 2000s. Third, had firm characteristics remained constant, 
firms would hold less cash. Apparently, the reason firms hold more cash is that their characteristics 
changed in a way that makes it optimal for them to hold more cash. This latter evidence is inconsistent 
with the view that there was a regime shift in cash holdings.   
 
Section 5. Why did the cash ratio increase? 
Section 4 shows that changes in firm characteristics are the major reason cash holdings increase. In 
this section, we attempt to attribute the increase in cash holdings to specific changes in firm 
characteristics. To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the modified OPSW model for the 
1980s using Fama-McBeth regressions. Second, we compute how actual cash holdings differ from cash 
holdings predicted by that model in the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, we attribute the increase in predicted 
cash holdings to changes in specific firm characteristics.  
The Fama-McBeth estimates of the modified OPSW model for the 1980s are as follows: 
 
Cash ratio = 0.3099 + 0.2334 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.0069 Market-to-book – 0.0092 Log 
size + 0.0579 Cash-flow/Assets – 0.2339 Net working capital/Assets – 0.3560 Capital   18 
expenditures/Assets – 0.3693 Leverage + 0.0361 R&D/Sales – 0.0269 Dividends/Assets – 0.2046 
Acquisitions/Assets + 0.1155 Net equity/Assets + 0.1743 Net debt/Assets 
 
All Fama-McBeth t-statistics exceed 4.0 in absolute value. The regression coefficients do not differ 
much from the regression coefficients reported in Table 3.  
Table 4 reports the predicted cash ratios for the whole sample in column 2. The difference between 
the actual and predicted cash ratios is in column 3 and the t-statistic for the difference is in column 4.  
The actual average cash ratio is not reproduced but is equal to the sum of columns 2 and 3. In 2004, the 
difference between the predicted and actual cash ratios is half a percent and is (barely) insignificant. 
Strikingly, all differences that are significant actually indicate that the model predicts a higher cash ratio 
than the actual cash ratio over the sample period. The regression model does a better job of predicting the 
cash ratios late in the post-estimation period than early. From the perspective of this cash ratio model, the 
surprise is not in the high cash ratios of the last few years but in the low cash ratios of the early 1990s. 
The early years include a recession, but so do the early 2000s when the model underpredicts the average 
cash ratio.  
In the next three columns of Table 4, we focus on the S&P 500 firms in our sample. Remember that 
for a firm to be in our sample it has to be an industrial firm and have the data we need to estimate the 
modified OPSW model. The results are again striking. The OPSW model estimated using the 1980s 
predicts cash holdings of S&P 500 firms well. The unexpected cash holdings are not significantly 
different from zero in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Over the same period, the unexpected cash holdings of the 
non-S&P 500 firms average to 0.07% and only one t-statistic is significant. Though we do not reproduce 
the results, the model does poorly with recent IPO firms. For these firms, the prediction errors slightly 
exceed 8% in 2002, 2003 and 2004. As a result, the model substantially underpredicts the cash ratios of 
firms with an IPO during the past five years and overpredicts the cash holdings of the other firms. An   19 
additional unreported analysis indicates that firms with foreign taxable income always hold less cash than 
predicted, but the extent to which they do so is rather trivial in recent years. 
We turn finally to dividend and non-dividend payers. Column 8 of Table 4 shows the predicted 
average cash ratio for dividend payers. The model predicts an increase in the average cash ratio of 
47.66% from 1990 to 2004 for non-dividend payers, but an increase of only 31.87% for dividend payers. 
In fact, however, the actual increase in the ratio for dividend payers is even smaller, so that dividend 
payers hold less cash than predicted. When we turn to non-dividend payers, we see that the errors of the 
model are typically small and insignificant.  
The model predicts an increase in the average cash ratio from 1990 to 2004 for the whole sample of 
49.23%. How can such a large increase be explained? To answer this question, we investigate how firm 
characteristics change over time and how this change affects cash ratios. To understand our procedure, 
consider a firm that has average industry cash flow volatility throughout the 1980s. The volatility would 
be 7.05%. The coefficient on industry cash flow volatility in the Fama-McBeth regression is 0.2334. 
Consequently, in 1980 we would expect a cash ratio of 1.65% due to industry cash flow volatility 
(0.2334*7.05%). Average industry cash flow volatility increases sharply during our sample period. A firm 
that has average cash flow volatility in 2004 would have cash flow volatility of 16.44%. In 2004, a cash 
ratio of 3.84% would be explained by average cash flow volatility. If all explanatory variables except cash 
flow volatility had stayed the same, we would expect the average cash ratio to have increased by 2.19% 
from 1980 to 2004 because of the increase in cash flow volatility.  
Table 5 attributes the increase in the predicted cash ratio to changes in the determinants of that ratio. 
The increase in the cash ratio is the difference between the average over 2000-2004 and the average for 
the 1980s. The first column of Table 5 shows the decomposition for the whole sample. Most of the 
change in predicted cash holdings is explained by three variables. In order of importance, these variables 
are the change in net working capital net of cash, the change in cash flow risk, and the change in capital 
expenditures.    20 
In risk management theories, greater volatility of cash flow imposes deadweight costs of financial 
distress.
5 One would expect firms with greater volatility of cash flow to hedge more, but if they have 
unhedgeable risks, they would hold more cash. It is therefore not surprising that firms hold more cash as 
cash flow risk increases. Average industry cash flow risk increases from an average of 7.05% in the 1980s 
to an average of 15.93% in the 2000s. It is interesting to note, however, that the increase in cash flow risk 
has stagnated over the recent years. Net working capital falls by more than 10% of assets from the 1980s 
to the 2000s. The largest contributor to that fall is the decrease in inventories. In the 1980s, inventories 
average to 19.88% of assets. In contrast, in the 2000s, the average is 12.13%. The decrease in inventories 
is more dramatic when we look at the median (not reported) since the median averages 18.33% in the 
1980s, but only 7.47% in the 2000s. In addition to the decrease in inventories, a decrease in accounts 
receivable also contributes substantially to the fall in net working capital. In the 1980s, accounts 
receivable averages to 20.33%. In contrast, in the 2000s, the average of accounts receivable for the whole 
sample is 15.07%. 
We turn next to the question of why the average predicted cash ratio grew more for some firms than 
others. The third and fourth columns of Table 5 decompose the change in the predicted cash ratio for S&P 
500 firms and non-S&P 500 firms. For this decomposition, we use the change in the determinants of the 
cash ratio for the subsample we consider. For instance, when we attribute the change in the predicted cash 
ratio for S&P 500 firms, we consider the impact on the predicted cash ratio of the change in the average 
value of the explanatory variables in the OPSW model from the 1980s to 2000-2004 for these firms. The 
fifth column of Table 5 decomposes the difference in the change in the predicted cash ratio between the 
S&P 500 firms and the non-S&P 500 firms. Considering first the non-S&P 500 firms, we see that the 
change in net working capital and the change in cash flow risk together explain an increase in the cash 
ratio corresponding almost to 5%. The only other variable that has a contribution in excess of 1% is the 
change in capital expenditures. When we turn to the S&P 500 firms, the same three variables are 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Smith and Stulz (1983) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). Minton and Schrand (1999) 
examine cash flow volatility and its deadweight costs empirically.    21 
important, but their contribution is slightly less than for the non-S&P 500 firms. From the average of the 
1980s to the average of the 2000s, the difference in the increase in the predicted cash ratio between non-
S&P 500 and S&P 500 firms is 1.66%. As seen from the decomposition of this difference, the two largest 
components in absolute value are leverage and R&D.  In the OPSW regression, the cash ratio falls with 
leverage and increases with R&D. Leverage falls slightly for the non-S&P 500 firms but stays roughly 
constant for the S&P 500 firms. More strikingly, R&D increases much more for non-S&P 500 firms than 
for the S&P 500 firms.   
The last three columns of Table 5 illustrate the determinants of changes in predicted cash holdings for 
dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers. We consider first the decomposition for the non-dividend 
payers. We see that the increase in cash flow risk and the decrease in net working capital explain a 2.14% 
and 2.20% increase in the cash ratio, respectively. Further, a leverage decrease, a decrease in capital 
expenditures and an increase in R&D together explain roughly a 4% increase in the cash ratio. When we 
turn to dividend payers, the contribution of the decrease in net working capital and of the increase in cash 
flow risk stands out. The leverage of non-dividend payers decreased relative to the leverage of the 
dividend payers. This differential evolution explains an increase in the cash ratio of non-dividend payers 
compared to the cash ratio of dividend payers of 1.97%. R&D expenses increased more for non-dividend 
payers which explains a differential of 0.99% in the cash flow ratio change. Finally, the cash flow risk of 
dividend payers increased less than the cash flow risk of non-dividend payers. 
 
Section 6. Conclusion 
We document a dramatic increase in the average cash ratio for U.S. firms between 1980 and 2004. 
We show that this increase is concentrated among firms that do not pay a regular dividend. The main 
reasons for the increase in the cash ratio is that cash flow risk for American firms has increased, 
inventories have fallen, capital expenditures have fallen, and R&D expenditures have increased. The 
increase in cash flow risk is connected to the widely studied increase in idiosyncratic risk. Recent   22 
evidence of a decrease in idiosyncratic risk might lead American firms to hold less cash.
6 However, the 
decrease in inventories is probably here to stay. Further, the greater importance of R&D relative to capital 
expenditures also has a permanent effect on the cash ratio. The cash ratio is sharply increasing in R&D. 
R&D investment opportunities are difficult to finance for firms that face financial difficulties, so that such 
firms require a greater cash buffer.  
Our evidence shows that the increase in cash ratios, while dramatic, can be explained by the change in 
firm characteristics over our sample period. There is no evidence of an exogenous change in the demand 
for cash. The data are consistent with existing evidence showing that the precautionary motive to hold 
cash is a critical determinant of the demand for cash. Though the market for derivatives has grown 
dramatically, our evidence suggests that firms face many risks that they cannot hedge or are reluctant to 
use derivatives to hedge risks. It seems much harder to explain our evidence by an increase in agency 
problems that lead managers to hoard cash because the drivers of the increase in the cash ratio are not 
generally considered to be proxies for agency problems.  
We also document a dramatic decrease in net debt for American firms. If cash is simply negative debt, 
leverage ought to be measured using net debt. In this case, the popular measures of leverage used in the 
finance literature miss a stunning evolution in the leverage of American firms. By 2004, using net debt, 
the average American firm had no leverage. However, if cash is not simply negative debt, its importance 
for the typical American firm is greater than its long-term debt (since cash greater than total debt). 
Assuredly, cash enables firms to forestall distress and default. It follows that the growing importance of 
cash should be taken into account seriously when evaluating the financial condition of firms and when 
assessing the capital structure decisions of firms.  
                                                 
6 See Brandt, Brav, and Graham (2005).   23 
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Table 1:  Average and median cash and leverage ratios over time 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004 with non-missing data for the book 
value of total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in the U.S.  Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) 
and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are also excluded from the sample, yielding a panel of 110,599 observations 
for 13,237 unique firms.  The cash ratio is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book 
value of total assets.  Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value total assets, where debt 
includes long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities.  Net leverage is computed as the difference between total 





















          
1980  3519  0.1048 0.0548 0.2692 0.2433 0.1645 0.1784 
1981  3748  0.1207 0.0583 0.2534 0.2275 0.1327 0.1602 
1982  3752  0.1211 0.0643 0.2613 0.2324 0.1402 0.1579 
1983  4120  0.1589 0.0868 0.2458 0.2040 0.0867 0.1111 
1984  4172  0.1399 0.0687 0.2543 0.2177 0.1142 0.1407 
1985  4127  0.1420 0.0704 0.2696 0.2302 0.1275 0.1508 
1986  4261  0.1574 0.0812 0.2732 0.2363 0.1155 0.1431 
1987  4407  0.1564 0.0771 0.2726 0.2411 0.1162 0.1531 
1988  4237  0.1412 0.0683 0.2805 0.2438 0.1393 0.1631 
1989  4095  0.1375 0.0633 0.2859 0.2534 0.1483 0.1735 
1990  4042  0.1341 0.0615 0.2817 0.2444 0.1475 0.1678 
1991  4137  0.1545 0.0722 0.2589 0.2145 0.1044 0.1287 
1992  4307  0.1626 0.0791 0.2452 0.1931 0.0823 0.1110 
1993  4713  0.1713 0.0828 0.2247 0.1794 0.0532 0.0914 
1994  4985  0.1553 0.0703 0.2304 0.1873 0.0751 0.1055 
1995  5165  0.1707 0.0724 0.2298 0.1874 0.0592 0.1048 
1996  5568  0.1926 0.0879 0.2216 0.1700 0.0289 0.0775 
1997  5605  0.1908 0.0893 0.2361 0.1795 0.0457 0.0854 
1998  5263  0.1783 0.0748 0.2887 0.2052 0.1103 0.1189 
1999  4971  0.1943 0.0771 0.2470 0.1979 0.0527 0.1044 
2000  4947  0.2081 0.0884 0.2420 0.1734 0.0337 0.0748 
2001  4540  0.2141 0.1070 0.2676 0.1732 0.0537 0.0619 
2002  4233  0.2139 0.1144 0.2580 0.1717 0.0447 0.0537 
2003  3992  0.2267 0.1332 0.2346 0.1601 0.0084 0.0158 
2004  3693  0.2403 0.1473 0.2251 0.1450 -0.0148  -0.0030 
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Table 2a:  Average cash ratios by firm size quintile 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004 with non-missing data for the book 
value of total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in the U.S.  Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are also excluded from the sample, yielding a panel of 110,599 observations for 
13,237 unique firms.  The cash ratio is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of 
total assets.  Size quintiles are established based on the book value of sample firm assets in the fiscal year prior to 
the calendar year in the left most column.  Differences in the average cash ratio between the largest and smallest 














1980 0.1788 0.1133 0.0897 0.0770 0.0653 
1981 0.2132 0.1387 0.1027 0.0852 0.0637 
1982 0.1843 0.1412 0.1120 0.0982 0.0698 
1983 0.2483 0.1755 0.1563 0.1272 0.0872 
1984 0.2305 0.1466 0.1358 0.1060 0.0807 
1985 0.2249 0.1515 0.1338 0.1162 0.0835 
1986 0.2374 0.1787 0.1496 0.1327 0.0889 
1987 0.2389 0.1811 0.1483 0.1251 0.0887 
1988 0.2082 0.1715 0.1383 0.1106 0.0771 
1989 0.1945 0.1696 0.1371 0.1125 0.0741 
1990 0.1832 0.1686 0.1343 0.1136 0.0706 
1991 0.2066 0.1864 0.1770 0.1275 0.0751 
1992 0.2274 0.2057 0.1822 0.1208 0.0772 
1993 0.2330 0.2241 0.1841 0.1355 0.0800 
1994 0.2266 0.2027 0.1611 0.1123 0.0737 
1995 0.2330 0.2387 0.1867 0.1240 0.0713 
1996 0.2569 0.2770 0.2206 0.1325 0.0761 
1997 0.2558 0.2692 0.2157 0.1326 0.0806 
1998 0.2502 0.2554 0.1873 0.1214 0.0772 
1999 0.2666 0.2584 0.2148 0.1404 0.0910 
2000 0.2612 0.2671 0.2543 0.1616 0.0964 
2001 0.2728 0.2655 0.2520 0.1716 0.1085 
2002 0.2712 0.2659 0.2528 0.1645 0.1149 
2003 0.2965 0.2849 0.2599 0.1728 0.1196 
2004 0.3292 0.3271 0.2594 0.1618 0.1241   27 
Table 2b:  Average cash ratios delineated by new issue status, accounting performance, and the 
payment of a regular dividend 
 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004 with non-missing data for the book 
value of total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in the U.S.  Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are also excluded from the sample, yielding a panel of 110,599 observations for 
13,237 unique firms.  The cash ratio is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of 
total assets.  Firms are assigned to the IPO subsample if they have gone public within the prior five calendar years and 
the non-IPO subsample otherwise.  Firms with accounting losses at the fiscal end of the designated year are assigned 
to the negative net income subsample.  A firm’s dividend status is defined by the distribution of a regular dividend in 
the designated calendar year.  Differences in the average cash ratio between the new issues, accounting performance, 
and dividend status subsamples are statistically different from zero at better than a 1.0% level for each reported year 
with the exception of differences in accounting performance for 1982. 
 















        
1980  0.0994 0.2107 0.1219 0.1011 0.0862 0.1301 
1981  0.1091 0.2313 0.1400 0.1155 0.0915 0.1513 
1982  0.1095 0.2095 0.1195 0.1217 0.1031 0.1377 
1983  0.1308 0.2748 0.1728 0.1531 0.1178 0.1887 
1984  0.1171 0.2135 0.1592 0.1318 0.1010 0.1654 
1985  0.1203 0.2061 0.1496 0.1378 0.1060 0.1637 
1986  0.1323 0.2254 0.1695 0.1505 0.1113 0.1813 
1987  0.1342 0.2091 0.1815 0.1425 0.1089 0.1785 
1988  0.1264 0.1872 0.1649 0.1289 0.1026 0.1591 
1989  0.1254 0.1808 0.1467 0.1324 0.0976 0.1564 
1990  0.1200 0.1874 0.1455 0.1277 0.0969 0.1513 
1991  0.1324 0.2448 0.1718 0.1442 0.1029 0.1773 
1992  0.1354 0.2616 0.1931 0.1458 0.1036 0.1884 
1993  0.1356 0.2645 0.2142 0.1477 0.1047 0.1976 
1994  0.1252 0.2220 0.2056 0.1318 0.0917 0.1785 
1995  0.1312 0.2476 0.2073 0.1516 0.0960 0.1976 
1996  0.1429 0.2761 0.2618 0.1538 0.0966 0.2238 
1997  0.1491 0.2631 0.2524 0.1541 0.1023 0.2177 
1998  0.1431 0.2513 0.2347 0.1404 0.0876 0.2054 
1999  0.1459 0.3017 0.2650 0.1450 0.0842 0.2246 
2000  0.1574 0.3269 0.2801 0.1435 0.0786 0.2393 
2001  0.1752 0.3451 0.2726 0.1471 0.0903 0.2431 
2002  0.1807 0.3622 0.2664 0.1600 0.0985 0.2414 
2003  0.2004 0.3800 0.2889 0.1822 0.1259 0.2556 
2004  0.2169 0.4025 0.3370 0.1887 0.1305 0.2757   28 
Table 3:  Regressions estimating the determinants of cash/assets. 
 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004 with non-missing data for the book value of 
total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in the U.S.  Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 
codes 4900-4999) are also excluded from the sample, yielding a panel of 110,599 observations for 13,237 unique firms.  
Missing explanatory values reduce the panel used here to 94,699 firm-year observations for 12,441 unique firms. The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total assets (the cash 
ratio).  Industry sigma is the mean of standard deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same industry as 
defined by two-digit SIC code.  Market to book is measured as: (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market 
value of equity)/book value of total assets.  Real size is the natural log of the book value of total assets in 2004 dollars.  Cash 
flow is defined as (earnings before interest and taxes - interest - taxes - common dividends).  NWC is defined as net working 
capital minus cash and marketable securities.  Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets.  
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets.  Dividend is a dummy variable set to one if the 
firm paid a regular dividend in the year, and 0 if it did not.  Acquisition activity is measured as the ratio of expenditures on 
acquisitions (Compustat data item #129) relative to the book value of total assets.  Net debt issuance is computed as the 
annual total debt issuance minus debt retirement in the fiscal year, divided by the book value of total assets.  Net equity 
issuance is calculated as equity sales minus equity purchases, divided by the book value of total assets.  Loss is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if net income is less than zero, and 0 otherwise.  IPO1 through IPO5 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the 
firm went public 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years ago respectively.  Models 2, 3, and 4 include separate intercepts for firm year 
observations from 1990s to the end of the sample period, and for 2000 through 2004.  When included, industry dummy 
variables are formed using two-digit SIC codes of sample firms.  T-statistics based on standard errors robust to clustering by 
firms over time are reported in parentheses.    29 
Table 3 (continued) 
 
















Intercept   0.2591 
(48.16) 
  0.2623 
(48.72) 
  0.3062 
(39.78)    
  0.3017 
(20.50)    
Industry sigma    0.3686 
(17.15) 
  0.4772 
(20.27) 












Market to book    0.0163 
(25.41) 
  0.0165 
(25.71) 












Real size    -0.0056 
(-8.93) 
  -0.0040 
(-6.28) 














  -0.0151 
(-2.74) 
  -0.0122 
(-2.23) 












NWC/ assets    -0.1946 
(-36.49) 
  -0.1998 
(-37.16) 












Capex   -0.2840 
(-27.51) 
  -0.3010 
(-28.70) 












Leverage   -0.3734 
(-63.00) 
  -0.3752 
(-63.10) 












R&D/ sales    0.0441 
(32.78) 
  0.0440 
(32.85) 












Dividend   -0.0413 
(-17.27) 
  -0.0462 
(-18.52) 














  -0.1579 
(-20.17) 
  -0.1576 
(-20.16) 














   
 
 
   








   
 
 
   






Loss dummy       
 
 
   
  0.0022 
(1.15)    
IPO1      
 
 
   
  0.0998 
(19.12)    
IPO2      
 
 
   
  0.0660 
(23.86)    
IPO3      
 
 
   
  0.0421 
(15.81)    
IPO4      
 
 
   
  0.0284 
(10.73)    
IPO5 
 
   
 
 
   
  0.0280 
(10.36)    
1990s dummy        -0.0278 
(-15.67) 
  -0.0741 
(-8.23)    
  -0.0745 
(-8.01)    
2000s dummy        -0.0086 
(-3.64) 
  -0.0417 
(-3.81)    
  -0.0274 
(-2.48)    
Industry 
Dummies 
 No  No  No      Yes  
Adj. R
2   0.4376  0.4376  0.4450      0.4969    30 
Table 4:  Predicted cash ratios and their deviations from actual cash holdings over time 
This table summarizes the predicted cash ratios of sample firms from 1990 through 2004, and deviations of the actual cash ratios from those predicted by an out 
of sample model.  Predicted cash holdings each year are derived from a Fama-McBeth model predicting cash ratios, the coefficients of which are the average 
coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions estimated over the period 1980-1989.  The cash ratio is computed as the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to the book value of total assets.  Estimates from this regression are as follows:  Cash ratio = 0.3099 + 0.2334 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.0069 
Market-to-book – 0.0092 Log size + 0.0579 Cash-flow/Assets – 0.2339 Net working capital/Assets – 0.3560 Capital expenditures/Assets – 0.3693 Leverage + 
0.0361 R&D/Sales – 0.0269 Dividends/Assets – 0.2046 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.1155 Net equity/Assets + 0.1743 Net debt/Assets.  The table summarizes 
differences between actual and predicted cash ratios, by year, for the whole sample (n = 58,414 firm-year observations), for firms in the S&P 500 index 
(n=4,496), and for firms paying and not paying a regular dividend (n= 14,611 and 43,803 respectively) during a particular year.  T-statistics summarize the 
statistical significance of differences between predicted and actual cash ratios for the whole sample and each of the observed subsamples independently. 
 



























              
1990 0.1497 -0.0155  -6.44 0.0987  -0.0236 -4.92 0.1092  -0.0114 -3.55 0.1689  -0.0174 -5.45 
1991  0.1697 -0.0147  -5.98  0.1093 -0.0350  -8.97  0.1196 -0.0155  -4.9  0.1918 -0.0144  -4.4 
1992  0.1749 -0.0140  -5.82  0.1159 -0.0390  -9.27  0.1263 -0.0218  -7.15  0.1960 -0.0107  -3.35 
1993  0.1841 -0.0141  -6.01  0.1207 -0.0459 -10.73  0.1324 -0.0244  -7.9  0.2049 -0.0099  -3.27 
1994  0.1765 -0.0245 -11.18  0.1183 -0.0504 -12.25  0.1255 -0.0348 -12.67  0.1953 -0.0208  -7.35 
1995  0.1796 -0.0172  -7.64  0.1178 -0.0477 -10.84  0.1226 -0.0308 -10.45  0.1997 -0.0124  -4.34 
1996  0.1905 -0.0063  -2.74  0.1204 -0.0484  -10.5  0.1241 -0.0301 -10.12  0.2123 0.0015  0.54 
1997  0.1859 -0.0042  -1.78  0.1216 -0.0498 -11.21  0.1272 -0.0250  -7.43  0.2041 0.0022  0.75 
1998  0.1725 -0.0056  -2.26  0.1199 -0.0475 -10.03  0.1150 -0.0304  -9.2  0.1900 0.0020  0.66 
1999  0.1899 -0.0110  -4.33  0.1276 -0.0441  -7.91  0.1146 -0.0314  -9.15  0.2116 -0.0051  -1.64 
2000  0.2005 -0.0072  -2.66  0.1389 -0.0369  -5.92  0.1174 -0.0383 -11.26  0.2216 0.0007  0.2 
2001  0.2027 -0.0052  -1.74  0.1454 -0.0220  -3.23  0.1225 -0.0345  -9.13  0.2226 0.0020  0.55 
2002  0.2024 -0.0038  -1.27  0.1485 -0.0068  -0.9  0.1310 -0.0358  -9.13  0.2200 0.0041  1.12 
2003  0.2141 -0.0012  -0.38  0.1542 -0.0045  -0.61  0.1426 -0.0238  -5.76  0.2350 0.0054  1.41 
2004 0.2234  0.0051 1.64 0.1571  -0.0077 -1.08 0.1440  -0.0212 -5.17 0.2494  0.0138 3.51   31 
Table 5:  Determinants of changes in predicted cash between 1990 and 2004 
 
This table summarizes the determinants of the change in predicted cash ratios between 1990 and 2004.  The change in the cash ratio is measured as the difference 
between the average cash ratio from 2000 through 2004 and the average cash ratio from 1980 through 1989.  The cash ratio is computed as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to the book value of total assets.  The determinants of the cash ratio are modeled as: Cash ratio = 0.3099 + 0.2334 Industry cash flow 
volatility + 0.0069 Market-to-book – 0.0092 Log size + 0.0579 Cash-flow/Assets – 0.2339 Net working capital/Assets – 0.3560 Capital expenditures/Assets – 
0.3693 Leverage + 0.0361 R&D/Sales – 0.0269 Dividends/Assets – 0.2046 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.1155 Net equity/Assets + 0.1743 Net debt/Assets.  Industry 
sigma is the mean of standard deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same industry as defined by two-digit SIC code.  Market to book is 
measured as: (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets.  Real size is the natural log of the book value 
of total assets in 2004 dollars.  Cash flow is defined as (earnings before interest and taxes - interest - taxes - common dividends).  NWC is defined as net working 
capital minus cash and marketable securities.  Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets.  Leverage is defined as the ratio of total 
debt to the book value of total assets.  Dividend is a dummy variable set to one if the firm paid a regular dividend in the year, and 0 if it did not.  Acquisition 
activity is measured as the ratio of expenditures on acquisitions relative to the book value of total assets.  Net debt issuance is computed as the annual total debt 
issuance minus debt retirement in the fiscal year, divided by the book value of total assets.  Net equity issuance is calculated as equity sales minus equity 
purchases, divided by the book value of total assets.   
 
    Whole Sample    S&P 500 Index  Non-S&P 500 
Index  Difference   Dividend Paying 
Firms 
Non-Dividend 
Paying Firms  Difference 
Industry  sigma   0.0206  0.0184  0.0208  0.0024  0.0145  0.0214  0.0069 
Market  to  book    0.0025  0.0069  0.0020  -0.0049   0.0027  0.0014  -0.0013 
Real  size    -0.0072  -0.0067  -0.0076  -0.0010  -0.0092  -0.0120  -0.0028 
Cash flow/ assets    -0.0021    0.0014  -0.0024  -0.0038    0.0005  -0.0014  -0.0019 
NWC/  assets    0.0250  0.0232  0.0252  0.0020  0.0203  0.0220  0.0016 
Capex    0.0128  0.0120  0.0128  0.0008  0.0107  0.0143  0.0035 
Leverage    0.0077  -0.0026  0.0088  0.0114  -0.0037  0.0160  0.0197 
R&D/  sales    0.0089  0.0012  0.0096  0.0084  0.0002  0.0101  0.0099 
Dividend   0.0051    0.0057  0.0049  -0.0008    n/a  n/a  n/a 
Acquisition activity    -0.0008    -0.0008  -0.0008  0.0000  -0.0018  -0.0006  0.0012 
Net  equity  issuance    0.0006  -0.0016  0.0007  0.0023  -0.0012  -0.0018  -0.0006 
Net debt issuance    -0.0015    -0.0013  -0.0015  -0.0002    -0.0023  -0.0009  0.0014 
TOTAL       0.0560  0.0725  0.0166  0.0307  0.0684  0.0377   32 
Figure 1:  Average cash ratios by firm size quintile from 1980 to 2004 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004 with non-missing data for the book value of total assets and sales 
revenue for firms incorporated in the U.S.  Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are also excluded from the 
sample, yielding a panel of 110,599 observations for 13,237 unique firms.  The cash ratio is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to 
the book value of total assets.  Quintiles are sorted on firm size based on the book value of sample firm assets in the fiscal year prior.  The first 
quartile (Q1) is comprised of the smallest firms in the sample while the fifth quartile (Q5) is comprised of the largest firms in the sample.  
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